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I. INTRODUCTION
Summary judgment law in Hawaii courts is approaching a crossroads. The
path it takes will be influenced by the courts' view of recent changes in the
federal summary judgment landscape. A trilogy of 1986 United States Supreme
Court cases1 has sent a message, loud and dear to trial judges: "Summary judg-
ment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut,
but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole .... ." This
message has not gone unheeded; federal and state courts alike are looking to the
opinions in these three cases to unlock the wonders of summary adjudication.'
Our inquiry is divided into four parts. The first is an overview of Hawaii's
traditional and somewhat murky approach to summary judgment law. The sec-
ond part is an in-depth critique of the 1986 Supreme Court trilogy regarding
the evolution of - some say revolution in - federal summary judgment law.
The third is a description of the Hawaii appellate courts' apparent drift toward
federal standards without express adoption or discussion of underlying value
tensions. The final part describes three alternate paths to Hawaii's summary
judgment future and analyzes each path doctrinally and in light of competing
values of efficiency and access. Our premise is that this value tension provides
context for meaningful evaluation of summary judgment law. As Justice Rehn-
quist observed in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,4 summary judgment exists not in a
vacuum, but within a system of procedural rules and standards.
What is the context of summary judgment reform? A perceived "litigation
explosion" in federal and state courts has generated cries for litigation reform.
Accounts of delay and excessive cost have fueled a strong movement toward
efficiency improvements, nationally and in Hawaii. Reform has occurred at two
levels: administrative reforms, such as computerized case files and more efficient
calendaring systems; and procedural reforms for admitting and handling cases.
In the federal courts, the procedural reforms include "new" Rules 11, 16,6 and
26,' often referred to as managerial rules. 8 Hawaii courts have adopted
' Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986); Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
* Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. at 327.
SA LEXIS search has revealed over 3,000 citations to Celotex in published state and federal
court opinions as of March 1990.
4 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986).
' Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 (deterring unreasonable filings).
6 Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 (pretrial conferences).
' Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 (limiting discovery).
' See Yamamoto, Case Management and the Hawaii Court: The Evolving Role of the Manage-
rialJudge in Civil Litigation, 9 U. HAW. L. Rrv. 395 (1987). Modified versions of these rules are
pending before the Hawaii Supreme Court. The rules are recommended by the Judiciary's rules
committee chaired by Judge Philip T. Chun. Professor Yamamoto served as counsel for the
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mandatory arbitration and greatly revised circuit court rules and are currently
considering modified versions of the recently amended Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (FRCP).'
One price of enthusiastic efficiency reform is diminished court access. Are the
reforms worth the price? Does everyone benefit equally from the reduction of
cost and delay? Does reform undermine values of the litigation processes -
values such as personal dignity, individual participation in governmental pro-
cess, public education and institutional accountability?1" Summary judgment re-
form is appropriately analyzed in the context of these questions.
For the sake of discussion, we have identified two conceptually distinct, al-
though practically related, dimensions of summary judgment law. The first di-
mension is the "mechanics" of summary judgment; the second is the "substan-
tive standard" for summary judgment. Summary judgment "mechanics" has
two facets: technical requirements such as filing deadlines, use of affidavits, and
interrogatories;1" and the burdens of producing evidence by the movant1" and
respondent. This article focuses on the latter facet of summary judgment
mechanics because it is conceptually complex and practically important and be-
cause shifting burdens of production enable courts to regulate the balance of
power between plaintiffs and defendants.
The "substantive" summary judgment standard refers to the standard that a
court applies to decide whether, after both sides have carried their burdens of
production, the movant has satisfied its ultimate burden of persuasion on the
motion (no genuine issue of material fact and entitled to judgment as a matter
of law). This article focuses on the substantive standard because it too affects
the balance of power between plaintiffs and defendants and implicates compet-
ing concerns about cost reduction and open court access. For example, if the
substantive summary judgment standard is "the slightest doubt," a plaintiff
that demonstrates possibly conflicting inferences arising out of scant evidence
will defeat a defendant's motion. The case then settles or proceeds to public
trial. In contrast, if the standard incorporates the "preponderance of the evi-
committee.
' Yamamoto, Pending Procedural Reform In Hawaii's Courts-New Civil Rules 11, 16 and 26:
Benefits and Problems of Active Case Management, 22 H^WAII BJ. 1 (1989).
10 Yamamoto, supra note 8, at 406-07; Michelman, The Supreme Court and Litigation Access
Fees: The Right to Protect One's Rights - Part 1, 1973 DUKE L.J. 1153, 1172 (1987).
" E.g., Wilder v. Tanouye, 7 Haw. App. -, 753 P.2d 816 (1988), clarifies the operation
of 56() concerning continuances to allow for discovery. Messier v. Association of Apt. Owners of
Mt. Terrace, 6 Haw. App. 525, 531, 735 P.2d 939, 945-46 (1987), allows filing of summary
judgment motions after the deadline for substantive motions set by Circuit Court Rule 12.
12 Courts and commentators use "movant" and "moving party" interchangeably to refer to
the proponent of the motion for summary judgment. Nonmovant, nonmoving party, respondent,
and responding party all refer to the party opposing the motion for summary judgment. We use
movant and respondent.
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dence" level of proof and requires the judge to assess the quality of the evi-
dence, the result is different. Defendant prevails; further cost and a public trial
are avoided.
Commentators suggest that the balance of power in federal courts has shifted
markedly toward defendant-movants, in principal part because of the United
States Supreme Court's recent analysis of both summary judgment mechanics
and the substantive standard."3 Whether that shift is salutary (restoring the
balance between plaintiffs and defendants), disastrous (equipping defendants
with a tool of harassment), or something in between is the subject of continuing
debate. We begin by summarizing and conceptualizing summary judgment law
in Hawaii.
II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN HAWAII STATE COURTS
Hawaii summary judgment law may be characterized in three ways. First, it
may be characterized by a lack of a precise mechanical framework. With few
exceptions, reported cases do not analyze summary judgment mechanics and
merely cite provisions of Hawaii Rule of Civil Procedure (HRCP) 56."' Second,
Hawaii law on substantive summary judgment standards may be characterized
by a clearly articulated appreciation for the values of jury access and full public
trials. Reported cases caution against limiting access to trials except in clear-cut
situations. Finally, Hawaii summary judgment law may be characterized by a
relative silence about efficiency concerns. These aspects of Hawaii courts' inter-
pretation and application of Rule 56 are discussed in the following sections.
A. Mechanics13 of Rule 56: Burdens of Producing Evidence
On a summary judgment motion each party bears a burden of producing
evidence. Conceptually, the movant must first support its motion by demon-
strating to the court that the evidence in the discovery record, supplemented by
affidavits, considered alone, warrants judgment for the movant. The respondent
must then respond by producing conflicting evidence or evidence that raises
" See, e.g., Lankford, New Life for Defensive Summary Judgment Motions, FOR THE DEFENSE 2
(April 1987) ("The United States Supreme Court has made it much easier for defendants to
obtain summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. . . . [T]he
defendant's obligation is merely to analyze plaintiff's evidence, not to disprove plaintiff's case.");
accord Stemple, A Distorted Mir'or, The Supreme Court's Shimmering View of Summary Judgment,
Directed Verdict and the Adjudication Process, 49 OHIO ST. I.J. 95 (1988).
14 See, e.g., Abraham v. Onorato Garages, 50 Haw. 628, 446 P.2d 821 (1968); Cane City
Builders, Inc. v. City Bank of Honolulu, 50 Haw. 472, 443 P.2d 145 (1968).
" Under the heading of "Mechanics" we focus on burdens of production. Technical require-
ments, which are also part of mechanics, are discussed generally throughout the article.
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conflicting inferences. Few Hawaii cases have addressed the parties' burdens of
production.
Mossman v. Hawaiian Trust Co.'s provided the Hawaii Supreme Court's first
instruction on the movant's burden. There, the court placed the burden on the
movant regardless of whether it had the burden of persuasion at trial.1" The
imposition of the initial burden of production on the movant, whether plaintiff
or defendant, is consistent with the supreme court's view that "caution on the
part of a trial court in the use of summary judgment procedure is commenda-
ble. "is In Mossman and for several years following, the court did not, however,
discuss the quantum of evidence needed to carry the movant's initial burden.
The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) added to the discussion of the
movant's initial burden of production and illustrated the operation of the re-
spondent's corresponding burden twenty-three years later in Arimizu v. Finan-
cial Security Insurance Co."0 Arimizu filed a complaint against his employer,
seeking a statutory penalty for failure to pay back wages. To support his sum-
mary judgment motion, Arimizu referred to deposition testimony showing that
his employer owed him wages and vacation benefits but refused to pay.20
Arimizu thus satisfied his initial burden of production on the motion under
Rule 56(c) through the use of specific evidence in the discovery record. The
burden then shifted under Rule 56(e) to his employer to respond with "specific
facts."
Under Rule 56(c), HRCP, once the movant satisfies the initial burden of showing
the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, "then the burden shifts to the
opponent to come forward with specific facts showing that there remains a genu-
ine issue for trial.''21
The employer "failed to factually raise his defense in resisting Arimizu's motion
for summary judgment," thereby failing to discharge its burden of production.
The motion was granted in Arimizu's favor."2
Arimizu is the dearest articulation of burdens of production to date, at least
where a plaintiff is the movant. But, its precedential value was thrown into
"6 45 Haw. 1, 361 P.2d 374 (1961).
17 Id. at 9, 361 P.2d at 379. "The rule is that the defendant, as the party making the motion
for summary judgment, has the burden of establishing the absence of a 'genuine issue as to any
material fact' even though, upon trial, the burden . . . would rest on plaintiffs." Id.
8 Id. at 12, 361 P.2d at 381 (citing 6 MOORE, FEDERAL PRAcricE S 56.15(1) (2nd ed.
1976)).
" 5 Haw. App. 106, 679 P.2d 627 (1984).
so Id. at 110-11, 679 P.2d at 632.
,1 Id. at 110, 679 P.2d at 632 (quoting Securities & Exchange Commission v. Murphy, 626
F.2d 633, 640 (9th Cir. 1980)).
'* Id. at 111, 679 P.2d at 632.
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question only two months later when the ICA seemed to ignore the Arimizu
standard in deciding Carrington v. Sears, Roebuck & Co."' In Carrington, the
court made no mention of the Arimizu burdens and stated only that "(wihere
there are no genuine issues of fact, a defendant . . is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law if it is dear that there is no discernible theory under which plain-
tiff could recover.""' As authority for this language, the court cited Abraham v.
Onorato Garages,' a case decided sixteen years before Arimizu, ignoring
Arimizu's elucidation of mechanics.
The critical issue unaddressed by Arimizu (which involved a plaintiff's mo-
tion) was the extent of the initial burden of production of a defendant-movant.
Must the moving defendant produce "specific facts," as a moving plaintiff
must, or can the defendant discharge its burden by simply asserting that the
discovery record lacks evidence supporting plaintiffs claims? The year after Car-
rington, the ICA seemed to address this question in Waimea Falls Park, Inc. v.
Brown. 6 The court again did not acknowledge the language in Arimizu. In-
stead, the court relied on a treatise on federal civil procedure and stated some-
what ambiguously that the summary judgment movant may discharge its bur-
den by showing that if the case went to trial there would be "no competent
evidence" to support a judgment for his opponent. 7
The guidance value of this statement for defendant-movants is questionable
because the movant in Waimea Falls was the plaintiff. The court did not ac-
knowledge the potential application to a defendant-movant attempting to sat-
isfy its initial burden of production by simply pointing to a bare record. The
opinion also failed to explain the meaning of "no competent evidence," the
manner in which a defendant-movant might demonstrate a plaintiff's lack of
evidence, or the manner in which the plaintiff-respondent might respond to
such a motion.
Waimea Falls again left the Hawaii courts without an encompassing, coher-
ently explained framework of the mechanics under Rule 56 concerning the bur-
dens of production, especially for defendant-movants. That apparent confusion
mirrored the ambiguous state of federal summary judgment law. A comment
descriptive of federal court rulings also generally describes Hawaii's past sum-
mary judgment decisions on mechanics: "The actual decisional process appears
to rely primarily on the facts of each case and a general, unarticulated sense of
13 5 Haw. App. 194, 683 P.2d 1220 (1984).
" Id. at 197, 683 P.2d at 1224.
* 50 Haw. 628, 446 P.2d 821 (1968).
,o 6 Haw. App. 83, 712 P.2d 1136 (1985).
" 'If no evidence could be mustered to sustain the nonmoving party's position, a trial would
be useless and the movant is therefore entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Id. at 92, 712
P.2d at 1142 quoting 10A WRIGHT, MILLER AND KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:
CIVIL 2D S 2727 (1983). The court also used the phrase "no competent evidence."
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when summary judgment is appropriate."-2 8
The failure of the courts, both state and federal, to dearly articulate and
follow mechanical standards defining the relative burdens of the parties appears
to have resulted in uncertainty among practitioners. 9 In addition, the absence
of a consistently applied framework may have contributed to decisions that
seem to have no sound procedural basis. Uffman v. Housing Finance and Devel-
opment Corp.30 is an example. In this fee conversion case, defendant moved for
summary judgment asserting that plaintiffs land failed to meet the requisite
five acre minimum. Defendant's evidence indicated that plaintiffs land was
4.713 acres, based on descriptions in recorded documents."' Plaintiff responded
by citing evidence indicating that the size of the area in question was 5.0002
acres, based on a recent survey of the beachfront land. 2 Despite this conflicting
evidence, the trial court granted the motion. The Hawaii Supreme Court ac-
cepted the trial court's determination without explanation even though the trial
court had summarily decided a disputed issue of material fact.
The lack of precise standards for summary judgment motions arguably con-
tributed to the puzzling nature of this decision. Did the court decide that plain-
tiff failed to carry its responding burden of production because its survey evi-
dence was inadmissible or otherwise unacceptable? Or did the court decide that
the substantive summary judgment standard was satisfied even though conflict-
ing evidence existed? Or did the court decide on some other basis? Neither
Rule 56 standards nor the court's rationale are adequately explained.
The lack of clarity and uniformity in Hawaii summary judgment law is par-
ticularly troublesome in light of Munoz v. Yuen."3 There the Hawaii Supreme
Court stated that appellate courts "will not examine evidentiary documents
• . .not specifically called to the attention of the trial court, even though they
may be on file in the case." 84 The court's intention was to avoid forcing appel-
late courts to "wade through all of a voluminous record" searching for relevant
documents, and thereby foster efficiency at the appellate level.3 5 One result of
this decision, however, is that a party responding to a summary judgment mo-
tion must bear the cost and bother of presenting its entire evidentiary case
"' Louis, Intercepting and Discouraging Doubtful Litigation: A Golden Anniversary View of
Pleading, Summary Judgment, and Rule 11 Sanctions Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 67
N.C.L. REV. 1023, 1042 (1989).
29 Id.
" 70 Haw. 64, 760 P.2d 1115 (1988). In this case, the plaintiffs sought a fee conversion
from defendants pursuant to Hawaii Revised Statutes Chapter 516. The statute stipulated that
such a fee conversion could not be obtained for a lot less than five acres in size.
Ii Id.
I ld. at 66, 760 P.2d at 1116.
8 66 Haw. 603, 670 P.2d 825 (1983).
I ld. at 606, 670 P.2d at 827.
'I Id. at 605, 670 P.2d at 826.
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couched in its various legal theories. The respondent at this pretrial stage will
always reveal its entire case for two reasons: (1) it does not know precisely what
is required to defeat the motion, and (2) it does know that if the motion is
granted, the appellate court will only consider evidence specifically called to the
attention of the trial court. Overkill by respondents seems inevitable.
In sum, Hawaii cases contain only scattered and inconsistent discussion of the
mechanical steps to a summary judgment motion. Attempts to articulate the
relative burdens of movant and respondent have not produced a definitive stan-
dard. The language in Arimizu" is perhaps the most detailed analysis by a
Hawaii court to date, but it is far from an encompassing framework. It leaves
unaddressed the burden of production of the defendant-movant, is rarely re-
peated in reported cases, and is not consistently followed. The lack of a uniform
standard can lead to wasted time for motions judges and litigants and unpre-
dictable results, perhaps frustrating the substantive principle declared by Hawaii
courts, discussed below, that summary judgment should be granted sparingly.
B. Substantive Standard Under Rule 56
1. The basic standard
When both parties produce some evidence in support of their respective po-
sitions on the motion, arguably satisfying their respective burdens of produc-
tion, the motions judge must then examine the evidence in light of a substan-
tive standard to determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists. A
standard that makes it difficult for defendants to prevail on summary judgment
may reflect the court's preference for public trials and jury access, but it may
also promote inefficiency and unfair settlements. On the other hand, a standard
that encourages defendants to file summary judgment motions without solid
grounds may transform summary judgment into a tool of discovery or even
harassment. And, this standard may disserve values associated with compromise
resolutions and public trials.
Hawaii courts historically have employed a substantive standard known as
"scintilla of evidence" or "slightest doubt," indicating a preference for settle-
ments or public trials and jury decisions rather than truncated case terminations.
In Abraham v. Onorato Garages, the Hawaii Supreme Court announced that a
defendant's summary judgment motion should be granted only if "it is dear
that the plaintiff would not be entitled to recover under any discernible theory"
and that "[t]he inferences drawn from the underlying facts . . .must be
e See rupra text accompanying notes 19-22.
7 50 Haw. 628, 446 P.2d 821 (1968).
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viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion."" Consis-
tent with the scintilla of evidence standard, the court did not incorporate the
level of proof at trial (preponderance of the evidence, for example) into the
summary judgment calculus. This combined posture has discouraged summary
judgments.
Ten years later, in Packaging Products Co. v. Teruya Bros. Ltd., 9 the Hawaii
Supreme Court again indicated that the substantive standard is weighted heav-
ily in favor of the respondent. If the court can find even arguably conflicting
inferences, it is not to grant summary judgment. "Where . . . the evidence is
fairly susceptible to conflicting interpretations, even though the operative facts
themselves are not in dispute, there is a genuine issue of a material fact and the
motion for summary judgment will be denied.4 The Teruya court also stated
that it is "incumbent upon the trial court to view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the party opposing the motion . . . and to resolve all mate-
rial ambiguities and disagreements against the movant.""4 Again, the court's
statements evinced a strong preference for case resolutions via trials, in practical
effect discouraging defendant summary judgment motions.
The preference for jury access is expressed strikingly in McKeague v. Tal-
bert."2 The ICA noted that the impact of summary judgment is "rather drastic"
and therefore "must be used with due regard for its purposes and should be
cautiously invoked so that no person will be improperly deprived of a trial of
disputed factual issues. '
Even in cases where the judge is of the opinion that he will have to direct a
verdict . . . he should ordinarily hear the evidence and direct the verdict rather
than attempt to try the case in advance on a motion for summary judgment,
which was never intended to enable parties to evade jury trials or have the judge
8 Id. at 632, 446 P.2d at 825; See also Del Rosario v. Kohanuinui, 52 Haw. 583, 586, 483
P.2d 181, 183 (1971); McKeague v. Talbert 3 Haw. App. 646, 650, 658 P.2d 898, 903
(1983); Kang v. Charles Pankow Assocs., 5 Haw. App. 1, 5, 675 P.2d 803, 806 (1984);
Hulsman v. Hemmeter Dev. Corp., 65 Haw. 58, 61, 647 P.2d 713, 716 (1982); Bidar v.
Amfac, Inc., 66 Haw. 547, 553, 669 P.2d 154, 159 (1983); Aku v. Lewis, 52 Haw. 366, 371,
477 P.2d 162, 165 (1970); Rodriguez v. Nishiki, 65 Haw. 430, 438, 653 P.2d 1145, 1150
(1982); Fasi v. Burns, 56 Haw. 615, 616, 546 P.2d 1122, 1123 (1976).
39 58 Haw. 580, 574 P.2d 524 (1978). This case was a contract dispute in which neither side
disputed the existence of or language in a bill of sale. The court found that the language was
subject to conflicting inferences about the intent of the parties and thus created a genuine issue of
material fact for trial. Id. at 584-85, 574 P.2d at 527-28.
" Id. at 583, 574 P.2d at 527. ("Not only must there be no dispute as to the basic facts but
there must also be no reasonable controversy as to the inferences which may properly be drawn
from them.").
41 Id. at 584, 574 P.2d at 528.
42 3 Haw. App. 646, 658 P.2d 898 (1983) (vacated summary judgment for plaintiff).
43 Id. at 650, 658 P.2d at 903.
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weigh evidence in advance of its being presented. 4"
This language exemplifies the conflict between Hawaii's historical treatment
of summary judgment and the new federal standard, discussed infra, which
tends to equate summary judgments with directed verdicts. 45 To the extent
McKeague is representative, Hawaii courts have recognized important differences
between summary judgments and directed verdicts.' 6 They have recognized that
the trial process serves values of personal dignity, individual participation, pub-
lic education and institutional accountability that are undercut by pretrial sum-
mary disposition of cases. When summary judgment is granted, the decision is
based on a paper record without a public trial. When a directed verdict is
granted, the decision is based on evidence scrutinized at a public trial - after a
party has had its day in court. This view also implies a preference for compro-
44 Id. at 651, 658 P.2d at 903 (citing Pierce v. Ford Motor Co., 190 F.2d 910, 915 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 887 (1951)). In Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., the United States
Supreme Court states the federal view: "It]he primary difference between the two motions is
procedural; summary judgments are usually made before trial and decided on documentary evi-
dence, while directed verdict motions are made at trial and decided on the evidence that has been
admitted." 477 U.S. 242, 251 (1986) (quoting Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461
U.S. 731, 745 n.ll (1983)).
"" Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., one of the cases in the federal trilogy which forms the basis
for the current federal standard, contains language antithetical to McKeague. 477 U.S. 242
(1986); see infra notes 105-122 and accompanying text. In Anderson, the court stated that "the
judge must view the evidence presented through the prism of the substantive evidentiary bur-
den" to be used at trial. 477 U.S. at 254. Thus, under Anderson, summary judgment is a di-
rected verdict before the trial, with the judge evaluating the "quantum and quality of proof
necessary to support liability" under the standard of proof that would be used at trial, to deter-
mine whether a question of material fact exists. Id.
"' What the Hawaii courts view the differences to be is not entirely dear. In contrast with
McKeague, in at least three cases, the Hawaii Supreme Court has noted the similarity between
summary judgment and directed verdict without noting the difference that at directed verdict
neither party is deprived of the trial experience. See Fry v. Bennett, 59 Haw. 279, 280-81, 580
P.2d 844, 846 (1978):
A summary judgment is analogous to a directed verdict. State v. Midkiff, 49 Haw. 456,
421 P.2d 550 (1966). The theory underlying a motion for summary judgment is substan-
tially the same as that underlying a motion for a directed verdict. In both instances the
movant is asserting that .there is no genuine issue of material fact to be resolved by the
factfinder and that he is entitled to judgment on the merits as a matter of law. 6 MOORE,
FEDERAL PRACTICE, § 56.04(2) (2d ed. 1976). Where, therefore, the proffered facts on a
motion for summary judgment or the evidence at trial on a motion for directed verdict,
and the inferences which may fairly be drawn from them, are reasonably susceptible to
conflicting interpretations, neither the motion for summary judgment, Packaging Products
Co., Ltd. v. Teruya Bros. Ltd., 518] Haw. [5801, 574 P.2d 524 (1978), nor the motion
for directed verdict, Young v. Price, 47 Haw. 309, 388 P.2d 203 (1963), will be granted.
See also, Waimea Falls Park, Inc. v. Brown, 6 Haw. App. 83, 92, 712 P.2d 1136, 1143
(1985)(also citing State v. Midkiff).
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mise resolutions over summary judgment. If the case is settled rather than adju-
dicated on summary judgment, the plaintiff recovers something rather than
nothing (if it is a defendant's motion) or the defendant contributes something
rather than everything (if it is plaintiffs motion).
Consistent with this larger view of the role of summary judgment in dispute
resolution, the Hawaii courts predominantly have limited grants of summary
judgment to dear-cut cases, e.g., where the respondent fails to proffer opposing
evidence.4" This comports with the Hawaii appellate judges' extreme distaste
for improvidently granted motions.48 Significantly, this larger view does not
explicitly acknowledge or attempt to accommodate efficiency concerns. Hawaii
courts have not addressed the costs and burdens on courts and movants result-
ing from denials of summary judgment motions - the expense and time of
further discovery, motions and trial; the settlement of cases involving claims or
defenses dearly lacking in merit; or the problem of busy court calendars.
2. Departure from the basic standard
In addition to their general disfavor for summary judgment, Hawaii courts
have displayed an extraordinary reluctance to grant summary judgment in three
classes of cases. First, the courts seem particularly disinclined to grant summary
judgments that foreclose the state or public interest in matters deemed to be of
"vast public importance." Second, the courts seem especially hesitant to grant
summary judgment in favor of defendants in ordinary negligence cases, particu-
larly where an injured individual is suing a corporation or someone indemnified
by insurance. Third, courts disfavor summary judgments where "state of mind"
or credibility is at issue. These cases demonstrate an even stronger judicial alle-
giance to access values than the basic standard. In contrast, in a fourth category
of cases, the courts have granted summary judgment for the defendant, even
though a jury might reasonably decide for either parry. This category of cases
seems to reveal a desire to keep certain decisions away from juries, possibly to
prevent the expansion of tort law liability.
a. Issues of public importance
A heightened summary judgment standard appears in cases involving contro-
versial public issues where summary judgment will foreclose the public's inter-
est. This elevated standard was first articulated in State v. Zimring.4 ' The Ha-
4 Arimizu v. Financial Sec. Ins. Co., 5 Haw. App. 106, 679 P.2d 627 (1984).
4 See infra the second paragraph of note 165 which discusses remarks made by Justice Padg-
ett and Judge Bums at a HICLE meeting.
49 52 Haw. 472, 479 P.2d 202 (1970). Zimring involved a dispute between the State of
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waii Supreme Court noted that the issue before it was "of vast public
importance"5 0 and employed the standard of Phoenix Savings and Loan, Inc. v.
Aetna Casualty and Surety Co.:1 "[S]ummary judgment should not be granted
unless the entire record shows a right to judgment with such clarity as to leave
no room for controversy and establishes affirmatively that the adverse party can-
not prevail under any circumstances.'"'5 The requirement that the record reflect
no circumstances under which the respondent can prevail is arguably a mere
rephrasing of the standard espoused in Abraham v. Onorato Garages that the
record demonstrate the respondent would not be entitled to recover under any
discernible theory." However, the court in Zimring added:
Judgment on issues of public moment based on . . . [conflicting affidavits], not
subject to probing by judge and opposing counsel, is apt to be treacherous. Cau-
tion is appropriate against the subtle tendency to decide public issues free from
the safeguards of critical scrutiny of the facts, through use of declaratory summary
judgment. 5"
The court recognized that the value of the trial process, beyond dispute resolu-
tion, is especially great when the outcome is of wide-spread particular interest or
will have a pronounced impact on the general public. The credibility and integ-
rity of the court system may be called into question if the court is perceived,
however erroneously, as giving only cursory treatment to an issue of vast public
importance.
The court reaffirmed its reluctance to grant summary judgment in cases of
public importance in Leong v. Takasaki"5 and Keller v. Thompson.56 In Keller,
the court quoted Phoenix Savings and Loan and the "vast public importance"
Hawaii and private land owners over title to new land created by a volcanic eruption which
extended the seashore boundary.
50 Id. at 476, 479 P.2d at 204.
6] 381 F.2d 245 (4th Cir. 1967).
2 Zimring, 52 Haw. at 475, 479 P.2d at 204.
Abraham v. Onorato Garages, 50 Haw. 628, 632, 446 P.2d 821, 825 (1968).
Zimring, 52 Haw. at 476, 479 P.2d at 205 (quoting Ecdes v. Peoples Bank, 333 U.S. 426
(1948)).
" 55 Haw. 398, 520 P.2d 758 (1974). The plaintiff in Leong brought the action to recover
damages for nervous shock and psychic injuries suffered without accompanying physical impact or
resulting physical consequences. The court declined to grant defendant's summary judgment mo-
tion on plaintiffs attempt to create new law concerning the infliction of emotional distress, hold-
ing summary judgment inappropriate as long as there is "any doubt" about a defense victory.
58 56 Haw. 183, 532 P.2d 664 (1975). The court reversed a grant of summary judgment for
general assistance recipients that declared a flat grant plan sought to be implemented by the
Department of Social Services null and void as without statutory authority. Ordinarily, the exis-
tence of statutory authority for administrative regulations is deemed a question of law that is
readily susceptible to summary judgment.
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language from Zimring and added that "this is precisely the type of case where
good judicial administration requires that the determination of the validity of
the regulations be withheld until all testimony is adduced after a full trial.'"
This language arguably goes beyond the Zimring standard and makes summary
judgment in a case of vast public importance an impossibility. The court's ap-
parent unwillingness to foredose the public's interest summarily suggests recog-
nition of the value of public education engendered by a public trial and the
value of enhanced system legitimacy derived from jury rather than judge deci-
sions on controversial matters.
Six years later, the Hawaii Supreme Court retreated somewhat from its ex-
treme position in Keller. In Molokai Homesteaders Cooperative Association v.
Cobb,58 the court upheld a grant of summary judgment, citing Zimring and
stating that "in cases of public importance summary judgments should be
granted sparingly, and never on limited and indefinite factual foundations." 9
Therefore, while maintaining that public importance cases should be treated as
a special category, the Hawaii Supreme Court has not foreclosed the grant of
summary judgment in such cases.
b. Issues of negligence
The Hawaii Supreme Court's stance with respect to summary judgment on
issues of negligence is frequently expressed through a quote from Pickering v.
State:"0 "[i]ssues of negligence are ordinarily not susceptible of summary adju-
dication." '61 Bidar v. Amfac, Inc.62 illustrates the extreme application of this
language. The plaintiff, a 220 pound person, was injured when a towel bar she
used to lift herself gave way. Plaintiff asserted defendant's placement of the
towel bar near the toilet was negligent. The trial court granted summary judg-
ment for the defendant hotel, in effect finding no dispute about the appearance
and intended function of the towel bar. The Hawaii Supreme Court reversed,
stating that both breach of duty and causation, even in this case, are issues not
susceptible to summary judgment:
57 Id. at 193-94, 532 P.2d at 672.
8 63 Haw. 453, 629 P.2d 1134 (1981).
59 Id. at 458, 629 P.2d at 1139 (emphasis added). See also Hulsman v. Hemmeter Dev.
Corp., 65 Haw. 58, 61 n.3, 647 P.2d 713, 716 n.3 (1982).
60 57 Haw. 405, 407, 557 P.2d 125, 127 (1976).
"1 See also McKeague v. Talbert, 3 Haw. App. 646, 650, 658 P.2d 898, 903 (1983); Messier
v. Association of Apt. Owners of Mt. Terrace, 6 Haw. App. 525, 536 735 P.2d 939, 947
(1987).
62 66 Haw. 547, 669 P.2d 154 (1983) (notably involving a private individual plaintiff and
corporate defendant).
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Whether the obligation to exercise reasonable care was breached is ordinarily a
question for the trier of fact to determine ..... "[r]easonable foreseeability of
harm is the very prototype of the question a jury must pass upon in particulariz-
ing the standard of conduct in the case before it." Whether the breach of duty
was more likely than not a substantial factor in causing the harm complained of
is normally a question for the trier of fact also."
The mere existence of possibly conflicting inferences arising out of undis-
puted facts precludes summary judgment in negligence cases. Since almost all
negligence cases involve some possibly conflicting inferences as to liability, the
court seems to have erected a nearly insurmountable barrier to summary judg-
ment in negligence cases.64 Why has the court done this? One explanation is
that "reasonableness" inquiries are fraught with ambiguities that are best re-
solved according to community standards as determined by juries. Another ex-
planation is that the court prefers to rectify, at least partially, the imbalance of
power between injured individuals and defendant companies (or individuals in-
demnified by insurance) by giving negligence case plaintiffs every opportunity to
try their cases before a jury or achieve some type of settlement.
c. Issues of credibility and state of mind
The Hawaii courts have indicated that issues of credibility and state of mind,
like negligence issues, present questions ordinarily left to the trier of fact. In
Jacoby v. Kaiser Foundation Hospital,68 a medical malpractice case, the ICA
employed the strict Zimring standard used in cases of public importance. The
court further stated that "the issue . . . of credibility . . . is for the trier of
fact . . . 'unless it also appears that the party opposing the motion cannot
prevail in any event and that the issue of credibility therefore is immaterial.' "66
Also within the category of credibility are a trio of complex defamation cases.
Each case involved materials which allegedly contained slanderous and defama-
tory statements suggesting that the plaintiffs, all public figures, had connections
6S Id. at 552-53, 669 P.2d at 159 (quoting 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS S
18.8, at 1059 (1956)). The court reversed the grant of summary judgment because "reasonable
minds could draw different inferences from the facts and arrive at conflicting conclusions on
relevant factual issues." Id. at 554, 669 P.2d at 160.
6 See also Johnson v. Robert's Hawaii Tour, Inc., 4 Haw. App. 175, 183, 664 P.2d 261,
268 (1983); De Los Santos v. State, 65 Haw. 608, 610-11, 655 P.2d 869 (1982); Leary v.
Poole, 5 Haw. App. 596, 599, 705 P.2d 62, 65 (1983); Lagua v. State, 65 Haw. 211, 215, 649
P.2d 1135, 1137-38 (1982).
0' 1 Haw. App. 519, 622 P.2d 613 (1981).
66 Id. at 527, 622 P.2d at 618 (quoting 10A WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE: CIVIL 2D § 2727 at 526-31 (1983)); see aso Aku v. Lewis, 52 Haw. 366, 378 477
P.2d 162, 169 (1970).
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with organized crime. The first of the trio is Rodriguez v. Nishiki,6" in which
the Hawaii Supreme Court stated that issues of state of mind are not suitable
for summary judgment:
If there is a factual dispute about defendant's state of mind with regard to actual
malice, summary judgment should not be granted .... "The proof of 'actual
malice' calls a defendant's state of mind into question, and does not readily lend
itself to summary disposition. '68
The court added that "if a statement can be interpreted as having both an
innocent and a defamatory meaning, it is within the province of the jury, rather
than the trial court in summary judgment, to determine the sense in which it
was understood.''9
In the second case, Mehau v. Gannett Pacific Corp.,70 the court merely quoted
the language of Rodriguez. In the third case, Beamer v. Nishiki,"' the court
expressed a preference for jury access and quoted Zimring, a public importance
case, as the standard." In a footnote, the court commented that it "searched in
vain for a single case upholding summary judgment for a public figure defama-
tion plaintiff."3
67 65 Haw. 430, 653 P.2d 1145 (1982). See generally, Cahill v. Hawaiian Paradise Park
Corp., 56 Haw. 522, 527, 543 P.2d 1356, 1361 (1975); Tagawa v. Maui Publishing Co.
(TAGAWA 1), 49 Haw. 675, 679, 427 P.2d 79, 82 (1967), appeal after remand, 50 Haw. 648,
448 P.2d 337 (1968).
68 Rodriguez, 65 Haw. at 439, 653 P.2d at 1151 (quoting Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S.
111, 120 n.9 (1979)).
69 Id. at 439, 653 P.2d at 1151. The Rodriguez court also stated that in actions involving the
alleged defamation of public figures, when "determining whether the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law," the proper burden of proof is "dear and convincing." Id. at 439,
653 P.2d at 1150. The court's dedication to sparing use of summary judgments when the issue is
defamation and its incorporation of a high burden of proof in the summary judgment calculus
make sense only when the movant has the burden of proof at trial. When the moving party is the
defendant, requiring the plaintiff to fend off the motion under a burden of "dear and convinc-
ing" proof would facilitate rather than discourage summary judgment and the court's position
would be a paradox. Cf Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
70 66 Haw. 133, 145, 658 P.2d 312, 321 (1983).
7 66 Haw. 572, 670 P.2d 1264 (1983).
72 Id. at 578, 670 P.2d at 1270-71. The court stated that "the question of the defendant's
state of mind is generally a question for the trier of fact." Id. at 584, 670 P.2d at 1274. The
court also repeated the "dear and convincing proof' language of Rodriguez. Id. at 582, 670 P.2d
at 1272-73. Like Rodriguez, this case only makes sense if it is viewed as applicable only to
instances in which the movant is asking for summary judgment of an issue he would have the
burden of proving clearly and convincingly at trial.
71 Id. at 584 n.9, 670 P.2d at 1274 n.9.
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d. Issues of compelling substantive policy
In recent years, the Hawaii courts have occasionally granted summary judg-
ments under less than dear-cut circumstances in a narrow category of cases. In
these cases, the courts apparently perceive a need for judges rather than juries to
control the expansion of tort law. These cases represent a departure from the
basic standard and favor summary judgments. They are connected by a core of
common attributes:
1. The plaintiffs rely on the language of existing principles, but seek to have that
language apply to a new category of fact situations;
2. The application of existing principles to this new category would significantly
expand the scope of current tort law, encouraging a host of previously ex-
dcluded filings; and
3. The facts in these cases are particularly compelling and a sympathetic jury
might stretch existing legal principles to conform to its view of the facts.
One example is Wolsk v. State,"4 where the Hawaii Supreme Court affirmed
summary judgment in favor of defendant, the State of Hawaii. Plaintiffs as-
serted that the State breached a duty to provide reasonable security against
criminal attacks against tent campers at a State camping park. The State pro-
vided facilities, invited campers, and created a park ranger force but failed to
undertake any security measures at the particular park despite a significant his-
tory of crimes against visitors there and at other nearby parks. Despite appar-
ently conflicting evidence about whether the State had a "special relationship"
with the tent campers, the court did not address the issue and affirmed sum-
mary judgment on the ground of an absence of duty. One explanation of the
court's decision is that a jury award for plaintiffs, a deceased doctor and his
seriously injured (hemiplegic) fiancee, would likely have opened the doors to a
multitude of claims against the State arising out of crimes at State parks."5
Another case in this category is Feliciano v. Waikiki Deep Water, Inc."'
Plaintiff Feliciano filed a dram shop action against a hostess bar, claiming that
the bar served him liquor after he was intoxicated. After leaving the bar, Felici-
ano drove his car and caused an accident rendering himself a quadriplegic. A
prior Hawaii case barred such a claim unless Feliciano could show that the bar
' 68 Haw. 299, 711 P.2d 1300 (1986).
s See also, Moody v. Cawdrey & Assoc., Inc., 68 Haw. 527, 721 P.2d 707 (1986) (The
Hawaii Supreme Court reversed the Intermediate Court of Appeals and reinstated defendant
condominium's summary judgment regarding criminal assault on condominium owner's guest in
the owner's unit); Note, Wolsk v. State: A Limitation of Governmental Premises Liability, 9 U.
HAw. L. REV. 301 (1987).
7 69 Haw. 605, 752 P.2d 1076 (1988).
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took "affirmative acts that increase[d) the peril to an intoxicated customer.""
Feliciano's opposition to the hostess bar's motion for summary judgment estab-
lished that he was an unsophisticated 19 year old from Waianae who had never
been to Waikiki. He did not recall asking for a drink but three hostesses
brought him four drinks over a two and a half hour period at a cost of
$175.00. He stated that he was intimidated by their aggressiveness and con-
sumed drinks he had not ordered. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower
court's summary judgment. It decided that "without more, aggressive sales of
drinks at a bar do not constitute affirmative acts that would create liability to
the consumer on the part of the bar or tavern. "78 It is not clear that a reasona-
ble jury would have reached the same conclusion. The court, however, declined
to allow a jury to expand substantive tort law, declaring as a matter of law that
the facts did not satisfy the rather ambiguous legal standard of "affirmative
acts." 
79
Cases such as Wolsk and Feliciano, in which jury access may lead to a marked
expansion of tort liability and litigation volume, provide the only detectable
exception to Hawaii courts' reluctance to grant summary judgment as reflected
in the basic standard. The use of summary judgment in this manner to effectu-
ate substantive policy is appropriate if a court dearly acknowledges its use of
the procedural vehicle for that purpose. The court seemed to do this in Felici-
ano but not in Wolsk. Somewhat ironically, these cases in which summary judg-
ment disposition is favored tend also to be cases of "public importance," in
which summary judgment is to be "sparingly granted."
III. THE FEDERAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
In 1986, the United States Supreme Court significantly changed"0 federal
summary judgment doctrine and practice through its decisions in Matsushita
Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,81 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,"2
and Celotex Corp. v. Catrett." These three decisions established a mechanical
and substantive framework that encourages litigants and federal judges to use
7 Id. at 606, 752 P.2d at 1077 (referring to Berrelmann v. Taas Assocs., 69 Haw. 95, 735
P.2d 930 (1987)).
78 Id. at 608, 752 P.2d at 1079.
7' Our analysis of the court's use of procedure to implement substantive policies is not meant
as a critique of the soundness of the policies.
'o See Stemple, supra note 13 at 99; Note, No More Litigation Gambles: Toward a New Sum-
mary Judgment, 28 B.C.L. REv. 747 (1987).
81 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
"8 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
83 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
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summary judgment more freely. 8' It is a framework that differs markedly from
central aspects of Hawaii's summary judgment approach. Mechanically, this tril-
ogy clarifies the burdens of production of the movant and the respondent. Sub-
stantively, these decisions incorporate the standard of proof at trial into the
calculus for determining the existence of a genuine issue of material fact at
summary judgment and redefine the capacity of motion judges to weigh con-
flicting evidence and assess the credibility of witnesses. These opinions also en-
able a judge to grant summary judgment because he or she finds the plaintiff's
theory of the case to be implausible.
A. Matsushita v. Zenith
Matsushita was a complex antitrust case brought by American electronics
manufacturers against Japanese manufacturers of consumer electronics products
(CEPs).8 8 Plaintiffs contended that the Japanese manufacturers conspired to
drive the American firms from the American CEP market by, in part, maintain-
ing artificially high CEP prices in Japan and artificially low CEP prices in the
United States.86 According to plaintiffs, defendants were able to carry out this
price-cutting scheme in the U.S. market over a twenty-year period because of
the considerable profits obtained in Japan through their concerted action and
the support of the Japanese government.8"
After years of detailed discovery, the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania granted defendants' motion for summary judg-
ment.88 First, the district court ruled that the bulk of plaintiffs' evidence was
inadmissible.89 Then, the court found that plaintiffs' claims depended on infer-
84 Commentators had been proposing clarification and reform of summary judgment law for
years before these decisions were handed down. See, e.g., Schwarzer, Summary Judgment Under the
Federal Rules: Defining Genuine Issues of Material Fact, 99 F.R.D. 465 (1984); Currie, Thoughts
on Directed Verdicts and Summary Judgments, 45 U. CHI. L. REv. 72 (1977); Louis, Federal
Summary Judgment Doctrine: A Critical Analysis, 83 YALE I.J. 745 (1974) (Justice Rehnquist
cites the Louis and the Currie articles in Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 n.5). Since 1986, many writers
have discussed the merits and possible ramifications of this trilogy of cases. See, e.g., Risinger,
Another Step in the Counter-Revolution: A Summary Judgment on the Supreme Court's New Approach
to Summary Judgment, 54 BROOKLYN L. REV. 35 (1988); Friedenthal, Cases on Summary Judgment:
Has There Been a Material Change In Standards?, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 770 (1988); Pierce,
Summary Judgment: A Favored Means of Summarily Resolving Disputes, 53 BROOKLYN L. REV. 279
(1987).
8" 475 U.S. 574, 577 (1986).
86 Id. at 577-78.
87 Id. at 580-82.
"8 Id. at 578-79. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 513 F. Supp. 1100
(E.D. Pa. 1981).
89 475 U.S. at 578. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 505 F. Supp.
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ences drawn from defendants' parallel conduct in the Japanese and American
markets and the effects of that conduct on the American companies.9" The
district court held that "any inference of conspiracy was unreasonable" because
(1) some of the evidence suggested that defendants' conspiracy did not injure
plaintiffs, and (2) the evidence of the alleged conspiracy failed to rebut the
more plausible inference that defendants were trying to compete in the Ameri-
can market and not attempting to monopolize it.9 '
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed,"2 finding that the lower
court had erroneously excluded admissible evidence and that "a reasonable
factfinder could find a conspiracy to depress prices in the American market in
order to drive out American competitors, which conspiracy was funded by ex-
cess profits obtained in the Japanese market.'
In a five-four decision, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals'
decision."' The Court found that, despite conflicting evidence on material is-
sues, the court of appeals "failed to consider the absence of a plausible motive to
engage in predatory pricing.'' 9 In the majority's view, the alleged predatory
pricing scheme made "no practical sense.''96 And, when a claim is one that
makes no economic sense, plaintiffs must present more persuasive evidence sup-
porting their claim to escape summary judgment."7 Although the Court re-
manded for consideration of any other evidence "sufficiently unambiguous" to
overcome the Court's conclusion that plaintiffs theory was implausible," the
majority's economic analysis signaled the end of this litigation.9 9
Some commentators view Matsushita's impact as limited to antitrust conspir-
acy cases. 0 0 The Matsushita opinion's broad statements, however, present
1190 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
" 475 U.S. at 579.
91 Id.
* In re Japanese Elec. Prods., 723 F.2d 238, 251 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd sub nom., Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 577 (1986).
93 475 U.S. at 581 (discussing the court of appeals decision).
4 Id. at 597-98.
9' id. at 595 (emphasis added).
"4 Id. at 597.
97 Id. at 587.
9s Id. at 597.
'9 See In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 807 F.2d 44 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
481 U.S. 1029 (1987) (On remand, the Third Circuit affirmed the trial court's judgment as to
all defendants).
100 See Risinger, supra note 84, at 36. ("Matsushita seemed to be too tied up with narrow
constructions of both the substantive law and the standards of proof in the antitrust area to be of
general impact."); Stemple, supra note 13, at 111 ("Summary judgment was merely the vehicle
by which the Court rid the judicial system of an antitrust claim disfavored by five of the Court's
members. As to summary judgment doctrine itself, the Court did not make vast doctrinal
pronouncements.").
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troubling implications for summary judgment doctrine in other types of cases.
Matsushita's "implausibility" test has been applied in gender discrimination
cases, enabling judges to dismiss a plaintiffs claim as implausible despite rea-
sonable inferences jurors might draw from direct evidence that support the
plaintiff's theory. 1 '
In addition, as noted by the dissenters,' the Court in Matsushita simply
ignored plaintiffs' expert testimony that contradicted the majority's economic
analysis of the case.' Instead of allowing a factfinder to determine which eco-
nomic theory was more plausible, the Court chose to evaluate and discount one
side's evidence and then weigh all evidence together as a prelude to finding
inadequate support for plaintiffs' theory. Justice White, writing for the dissent,
suggested that the majority overturned settled law by allowing a judge who was
hearing a defendant's motion for summary judgment to evaluate the evidence
and decide whether the weight of the evidence favors the plaintiff.'0 "
B. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby
Three months after the Matsushita decision, in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc.,10 5 the Supreme Court confirmed that it was encouraging broader use of
summary judgment to dispose of cases in the federal courts.
The plaintiffs'0 6 in Anderson brought a libel suit against columnist Jack An-
derson and The Investigator magazine' after the defendants published three
articles portraying the plaintiffs as "neo-Nazi, anti-Semitic, racist, and Fas-
cist.""0 The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted
defendants' motion for summary judgment, ruling that plaintiffs were limited-
101 E.g., Beard v. Whitely County REMC, 840 F.2d 405 (7th Cir. 1988).
102 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 577, 601-03 (1986)(White,
J. dissenting).
103 Plaintiffs' experts, including Dr. Horace J. DePodwin, Dean of the Graduate School of
Business Administration at Rutgers University, Kozo Yamamura, Professor of Economics and
Asian Studies at the University of Washington, Gary R. Saxonhouse, Professor of Economics at
the University of Michigan, and John 0. Haley, Associate Professor of Law at the University of
Washington, all agreed that plaintiffs' economic theory of the case was plausible in light of
Japanese business and export marketing practices. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus.
Co., 513 F. Supp 1100, 1137 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
104 475 U.S. at 600-01 (White, J., dissenting).
'05 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
'" The plaintiffs in this case are Liberty Lobby, Inc., a not-for-profit corporation and self-
described "citizens' lobby" and Willis Carto, its founder and treasurer. Id. at 244.
10 Named defendants were Jack Anderson, publisher of The Investigator, Bill Adkins, presi-
dent and chief executive officer of Investigator Publishing Co., and Investigator Publishing Co.
itself. Id. at 245.
108 Id.
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purpose public figures and therefore were required to prove their case under the
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan standards"0 9 and finding that actual malice was
precluded by evidence'1" presented by defendants."'
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed in
part,' holding that: (1) the evidentiary threshold at trial was irrelevant for
summary judgment purposes; (2) summary judgment should be denied when-
ever " 'a minimum of facts supporting the plaintiff's case' " can be estab-
lished;". and (3) a genuine dispute existed about whether publication was
made with reckless disregard of the truth.'1 4 The Supreme Court vacated the
court of appeals' decision, reinstating defendants' summary judgment."'
The Court's holding established two significant changes in summary judg-
ment jurisprudence. First, the Court determined that the evidentiary standard
of proof at trial" 6 (e.g., dear and convincing proof) must be considered in
ruling on a motion for summary judgment.11 "The mere existence of a scintilla
of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position will be insufficient; there must
be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff."118
Second, in contrast with the approach of Hawaii courts, the Court stated that
a trial judge must "bear in mind the actual quantum and quality of proof
necessary to support liability" when inquiring as to the existence of a genuine
issue of material fact." 9 And if, for example, "the evidence presented in the
opposing affidavits is of insufficient caliber or quantity," then no genuine issue
of material fact is raised.' 20 The majority thus held that the "quantum and
quality" of a respondent's evidence must be sufficient to defeat a motion for
109 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). This case held that, under the
first amendment, a libel plaintiff who is a public official must show, with clear and convincing
evidence, that defendant acted with actual malice. Id. at 279-80, 285-86.
' The district court relied on the affidavit of Charles Bermant, an employee of defendants
and the author of two of the three articles. Bermant stated that he obtained information about
the plaintiffs from numerous sources and that he believed that the articles were factually accurate.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 245.
... Id. at 246. See Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Anderson, 562 F. Supp. 201 (D.D.C. 1983).
11 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed as to 9 of the 30 allegedly
defamatory statements. Id. See Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Anderson, 746 F.2d 1563 (D.C. Cit.
1984).
1 0 477 U.S. at 247 (quoting the court of appeals, 746 F.2d at 1570). This "minimum of
facts" standard closely resembles the 'scintilla of evidence standard" apparently applied by Ha-
waii courts. See supra notes 37-48 and accompanying text.
114 477 U.S. at 247.
11 Id, at 257.
"" In this case, the applicable standard of proof was "dear and convincing" evidence.
11 id. at 252.
118 Id.
119 id. at 254.
Id. (emphasis added).
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directed verdict."' 1 In a striking departure from traditional practices, the Court
seemed to invite judges to evaluate the credibility of witnesses and the reliabil-
ity of evidentiary materials. Anderson not only puts an increased burden on the
respondent to establish that a material factual dispute exists, it also takes great
strides toward usurping the jury's role in interpreting conduct and making other
fact interpretations. "
C. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett
On the same day as the Anderson decision, the Supreme Court addressed the
procedural mechanics of summary adjudication in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett.12 3
The plaintiff in Celotex alleged that her husband's death resulted from exposure
to defendant's asbestos products."" In response, plaintiff produced three docu-
ments which tended to show that the decedent was exposed to defendant's
products.125 Nevertheless, the district court granted the motion for summary
judgment after defendant argued that the documents were inadmissible hearsay
and "thus could not be considered in opposition to the summary judgment
motion."16
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed, holding that
defendant's motion for summary judgment was "fatally defective" because de-
fendant "made no effort to adduce any evidence . . . to support its mo-
tion."11 2 7 The court of appeals, relying on Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.,"' found
.. Id. The Court stated:
[Tihis standard mirrors the standard for a directed verdict under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 50(a), which is that the trial judge must direct a verdict if, under the governing
law, there can be but one reasonable conclusion as to the verdict.
Id. at 250.
122 See Stemple, supra note 13, at 115:
IThe Court removed from the jury one of its traditional roles in litigation - to interpret
conduct and decide whether it was "reasonable," "negligent," 'reckless," "intentional,"
"indifferent," "fraudulent," "knowingly false," and the myriad of other fact interpreta-
tions that have been reserved to the jury, pursuant to the seventh amendment and the
traditional federal court practice.
The majority in Anderson denied that this was the result: "our holding does not denigrate
the role of the jury." Id. at 477 U.S. at 255.
123 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
I" ld. at 319.
I, ld. at 320. The documents included: (1) a transcript of the decedent's deposition from a
workman's compensation hearing; (2) a letter from decedent's former supervisor whom plaintiff
intended to call as a witness at trial; and (3) a letter from an insurance company describing
asbestos products to which the decedent had been exposed. Id. at 335-36 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
126 Id. at 320.
'27 Id. at 321 (quoting Catret v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 756 F.2d 181, 184 (D.C. Cit.
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that summary judgment was inappropriate because defendant had not submit-
ted affirmative evidence in support of its motion.1"9
The Supreme Court unanimously rejected the court of appeals' reading of
Adickes.130 The Court found that Rule 56 did not require a defendant-movant
to support its motion with specific affirmative evidence negating an element of
plaintiff's daim.
Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion stated that a moving defendant can
meet its initial burden of production by merely "pointing to the record" to
show that there is an absence of evidence to support the plaintiffs claim. 3 ' The
burden then shifts to the respondent plaintiff who must "go beyond the plead-
ings and by her own affidavits, or by the 'depositions, answers to interrogato-
ries, and admission on file, 'designate 'specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial.' "132 Because the lower court had inappropriately relied
on Adickes in construing the defendant-movant's burden of production, and
because the defendant had satisfied its burden by simply pointing to a bare
record, the Court remanded the case to the court of appeals to address the
adequacy of plaintiffs response to defendant's motion.1 33
Justice White concurred with the result but added the cautionary statement
that "[i)t is not enough to move for summary judgment without supporting the
motion in any way or with a conclusory assertion that the plaintiff has no evi-
dence to prove his case.-
1 3 4
Justice Brennan's dissent, which purported to agree with the majority's legal
framework while disagreeing with its application, drew upon Justice White's
reservation with the plurality opinion and artfully restated Justice Rehnquist's
procedural analysis in a way that softened its impact on plaintiffs opposing
summary judgment.1 3 ' First, Justice Brennan made dear that "[tlhe burden of
establishing the nonexistence of a 'genuine issue' is on the party moving for
summary judgment." '"16 This burden has two parts: (1) an initial burden of
1985) (emphasis in original)).
128 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
129 Catrett v. Johns-Mansville Sales Corp., 756 F.2d at 184.
... Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986); id. at 328 (White, J. concurring); id.
at 334 (Brennan, J. dissenting).
1a1 Id. at 325.
132 477 U.S. at 324 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)).
'33 Id. at 327-28. The majority stated, somewhat confusingly, that evidence need not be sub-
mitted in admissible form. Under Rule 56(e), a respondent may use the evidentiary materials
listed in Rule 56(c) (except the pleadings), including: depositions, answers to interrogatories,
admissions on file, and affidavits. Clearly, not all of these materials are in a "form" that would be
admissible at trial, but they may be used to support or defeat a motion for summary judgment.
14 Id. at 328.
1s5 Id. at 329-37.
'36 Id. at 330.
1990 / SUMMARY JUDGMENT
production (which we have defined as part of summary judgment mechanics);
and (2) an ultimate burden of persuasion (which we have defined as part of the
substantive standard).1 7 The movant must satisfy its initial burden of produc-
ing evidence before the burden of production shifts to the respondent and cer-
tainly before the court needs to decide whether the movant has satisfied its ulti-
mate burden of persuasion.1 8'
Next, Brennan described the movant's burden of production as a require-
ment that the movant "make a prima facie showing that it is entitled to sum-
mary judgment." ' 3 9 If the movant will bear the burden of persuasion at trial, it
must demonstrate that it would be entitled to a directed verdict at trial if its
evidence were uncontroverted.1 '0 If the movant will not bear the burden of
persuasion at trial, it may satisfy its burden of production in either of two
significantly different ways: (1) by submitting "affirmative evidence that negates
an essential element of the nonmoving party's daim;" or (2) by demonstrating
that the nonmoving party's evidence is "insufficient to establish an essential
element" of its daim.
1 41
The second option is a departure from prior law, expanding defendants'
summary judgment opportunities. It builds on the broad statement in Rehn-
quist's opinion about simply "pointing to the record," but recasts that state-
ment in a tighter conceptual framework. That option, as recast, enables a de-
fendant-movant to carry its initial burden of production without offering
"specific facts" in support of the motion. The defendant, however, must "af-
firmatively demonstrate that there is no evidence in the record to support a
judgment for the nonmoving party. "142 This affirmative demonstration may
"require the moving party to depose the nonmoving party's witnesses or to
establish the inadequacy of documentary evidence." '1 43 A condusory assertion
that there is no evidence will not suffice.1 "' Such a " 'burden' of production is
no burden at all and would simply permit summary judgment procedure to be
137 Id.
13 Id. at 330-31.
'. Id. at 331 (quoting 1OA WRIGHT, MIL.ER & KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:
CIVIL 2D S 2727 (1983)).
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 Id. at 332.
144 Id. If there is no evidence at all in the record, and there is no information in the record
reasonably likely to lead to admissible evidence, then the movant can affirmatively show the
absence of evidence by reviewing the admissions, interrogatories, and other parts of the record for
the court. Id. The defendant-movant cannot simply file a two page memorandum in support of
its motion asserting generally that the discovery record is bereft of admissible evidence in support
of plaintiffs claim.
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converted into a tool for harassment.'1 14 5
Summary judgment will be denied if the defendant-movant fails this initial
burden of production.1 6 If the movant's initial burden has been met, then
under Rule 56 (e) the burden of production shifts to the respondent, who must:
(1) locate relevant evidence in the discovery record that has been overlooked; " "
(2) rehabilitate the evidence attacked by the movant; 1 8 (3) produce specific
evidence, not yet in the discovery record, contradicting movant's assertions; or
(4) request further discovery as provided in Rule 56(f)."" Under Rule 56(e),
summary judgment will be granted if the respondent fails to respond or if, after
the response, the court finds that the movant has met its ultimate burden of
persuasion by showing the absence of any genuine issue of material fact for
trial. 15
0
Celotex, Anderson, and Matsushita have focused attention onto summary
judgment doctrine in the federal courts. The full impact of these decisions may
not be apparent for several years. What is apparent is that the revitalization of
the summary judgment mechanism is one aspect of systemic efficiency reforms
implemented to cope with the perceived increase in, and difficulty of, federal
cases and that the revitalization marks a shift in litigation power towards
defendants.
IV. Is HAWAII DRIFTING TOWARD THE FEDERAL STANDARD?
Several recent Hawaii cases use language indicating allegiance to some aspects
of the reformulated federal summary judgment standards without discussion of
the competing values of court access and efficiency or other ramifications of the
federal trilogy. Without such discussion, we find it difficult to conclude that
Hawaii courts have adopted the federal standards. References to Celotex and
Anderson, however, point to the need for full discussion of the issue, lest Hawaii
courts adopt federal standards by assimilation or default without consideration
of their effects. 151
15 Id. (emphasis added).
146 Id.
147 Id.
18 The nonmoving party must rehabilitate the evidence in the record attacked by the moving
party's papers. Presumably, the nonmoving party does this by presenting its own analysis of the
evidence contained in the affidavits, depositions, and answers to interrogatories disparaged by the
moving party.
149 477 U.S. at 332 n. 3. See also 1OA WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE: CIVIL 2D S 2727, at 138-43 (1983).
o Id. Justice Brennan's analysis is recast in a detailed framework in Section V, C, ifra.
, Although decided before Celotex, the trio of defamation cases surrounding the campaign of
Wayne Nishiki seems to lay the foundation for adoption of the federal standard because it ac-
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The ICA opinion in Hall v. State5 ' quoted from Celotex and Anderson but
did not expressly adopt the federal standards.' The decision did not acknowl-
edge the dissonance between Hawaii law and the federal trilogy. Indeed, the
weight of Hall's reference to Celotex and Anderson was thrown into question by
Wong v. Panis,' 4 decided by the same court one year later. In Wong the court
reviewed a grant of a defendant's summary judgment but made no mention of
Hall, Celotex or Anderson. It instead relied on Carrington v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co.""5 which in turn cited Abraham v. Onorato Garages," and McKeague v.
Talbert. '5 McKeague, as noted above, conflicts with the federal trilogy and is
the leading case for the proposition that Hawaii courts prefer to deny summary
judgment motions and to dispose of "undisputed fact" cases via directed ver-
dict after the presentation of evidence at trial.' 8
The Hawaii Supreme Court recently entered the fray with its decision in
First Hawaiian Bank v. Weeks."' The court started its discussion of the mo-
vant's substantive burden by citing section 2727 of a treatise by Wright, Miller
& Kane' 60 for the proposition that the movant "has the burden of demonstrat-
ing that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact relative to the claim or
defense." The court further stated that the movant "may discharge his burden
by demonstrating that if the case went to trial there would be no competent
evidence to support a judgment for his opponent."'' The court concluded by
cepts a directed verdict standard at the summary judgment phase. All three decisions contain
language to the effect that when the standard used at trial is one of "clear and convincing proof,"
in order to succeed at summary judgment the plaintiff must have sufficient proof such that a
reasonable jury could find the existence of the elements of plaintiffs case with convincing clarity.
Rodriguez v. Nishiki, 65 Haw. 430, 439, 653 P.2d 1145, 1151 (1982); Mehau v. Gannett Pac.
Corp. 66 Haw. 133, 145, 658 P.2d 312, 314 (1983); Beamer v. Nishiki, 66 Haw. 572, 578,
670 P.2d 1264, 1270 (1983). As discussed above, these cases also state that summary judgment
should be granted sparingly and therefore only make sense if the "dear and convincing" burden
is imposed solely on a movant who will have that burden at trial. Furthermore, these cases
constitute a departure from the basic standard followed by Hawaii courts and arguably apply only
to cases in which credibility or state of mind is at issue.
"' 7 Haw. App. -, 756 P.2d 1048 (1988).
158 Id. at __, 756 P.2d at 1055.
18 7 Haw. App. -, 772 P.2d 695 (1989).
188 5 Haw. App. 194, 197, 683 P.2d 1220, 1224 (1984).
186 50 Haw. 628, 446 P.2d 821 (1968); see also supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
157 3 Haw. App. 646, 658 P.2d 898 (1983); dee also supra notes 42-46 and accompanying
text.
18 See supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
'5 70 Haw. 392, 772 P.2d 1187 (1989).
160 1OA WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL 2D S 2727 at
121, 130 (1983).
161 70 Haw. at 396, 772 P.2d at 1190 (quoting OA WRIGHT MILLER & KANE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL 2D S 2727 at 130 (1983)).
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citing Celotex with a "cf." signal and reciting the Celotex proposition that the
movant can satisfy its initial burden by merely pointing to the record as devoid
of evidence in support of its opponent's daims.""
What did the court mean by this reference to the treatise and to Celotex? The
ICA had cited section 2727 of the Wright, Miller & Kane treatise in past cases
that retained the traditional Hawaii law perspective on the substantive standard
for summary judgment."' The court thus may have intended this quotation to
demonstrate its continued allegiance to the idea that summary judgment should
be granted sparingly. In Waimea Falls Park, Inc. v. Brown, the ICA cited the
same section 2727 for the proposition that "if the movant, by uncontroverted
affidavits or by using any of the other materials specified in the rule, completely
explores and establishes the facts, he may be able to demonstrate the absence of
any genuine issue of fact." 1 " This language requires more of the movant than
merely pointing to the record and asserting an absence of evidence, which seems
to be permitted by the Rehnquist approach in Celotex. Thus, the court's "cf"
reference to Celotex in First Hawaiian Bank is arguably a statement by the
court that it recognizes the existence of Celotex but has not adopted it - an
invitation to its readers to compare the Hawaii standard and the Celotex
standard.1 65
162 The actual language of the court is as follows:
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S. Ct. 2548 (1986) (One moving for sum-
mary judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 need not support his motion with affidavits or
similar materials that negate his opponent's claims, but need only point out to the district
court that there is an absence of evidence to support the opponent's claims). For '[i]f no
evidence could be mustered to sustain the nonmoving party's position, a trial would be
useless .... ." 10A WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra, at 130.
First Hawaiian Bank v. Weeks, 70 Haw. at 397, 772 P.2d at 1190.
168 Arimizu v. Financial Sec. Ins. Co., 5 Haw. App. 106, 679 P.2d 627 (1984); Jacoby v.
Kaiser Found. Hosp., 1 Haw. App. 519, 622 P.2d 613 (1981).
16 6 Haw. App. 83, 92, 712 P.2d 1136, 1142-43 (1985).
165 However, this view is arguably not in strict accord with the bluebook treatment of the
"cf" signal. The bluebook discussion of the "cf" signal appears under the heading "[s]ignals
that indicate support" and is described as meaning that the "(clited authority supports a proposi-
tion different from the main proposition but sufficiently analogous to lend support." A Uniform
System of Citation, Rule 2.2(a) (14th ed. 1986) (The definition goes on to state that "[l]iterally,
'cf.' means 'compare.' " Id. This provides further support for the argument that the court was
inviting a comparison and calling attention to the differences between Hawaii and federal court
practices.) Thus, the court's statement arguably means that the federal practice of allowing the
movant to meet its initial burden by merely pointing to the record is different from the Hawaii
practice but is sufficiently analogous to lend support. What does this say about the Hawaii prac-
tice? The bluebook definition of the "cf." signal is reconcilable with the argument of the preced-
ing paragraph if the similarity between the Hawaii and federal practices is that movant has the
initial burden of demonstrating to the court the absence of any genuine issue of material fact, and
the difference between them is the degree of affirmative action required of the movant to meet
this burden.
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V. AT THE CROSSROADS
The Hawaii courts can move in one of three directions: (1) they can continue
Hawaii's traditional and somewhat murky approach to summary judgment; (2)
they can adopt the federal trilogy, significantly reformulating summary judg-
ment mechanics and the summary judgment standard; or (3) they can attempt
to navigate a middle course, perhaps by incorporating Hawaii's substantive val-
ues into an improved mechanical framework. Each of these options has merit,
each has drawbacks. A productive analysis must consider both mechanical and
substantive aspects of these choices in light of the underlying values affected by
the various applications of summary judgment doctrine.
A. Maintaining the Status Quo
The first option is to maintain the status quo. Hawaii's current summary
judgment law, however, provides little practical guidance beyond the language
of Rule 56 itself. Mechanical aspects of the rule have been occasionally eluci-
dated, only to be ignored in subsequent cases.166 No clear statement has been
offered on the defendant-movant's options in discharging its initial burden of
producing evidence. Without dearer guideposts, summary judgment mechanics
will continue to be characterized by unpredictability.
Hawaii's substantive summary judgment standard is even hazier.1 67 Some
cases appear to adopt a "scintilla of the evidence" standard, which suggests
focus on a search of respondent's evidence for something to raise the "slightest
doubt" in the mind of the judge about whether movant should prevail. Other
cases speak of a directed verdict standard, which suggests consideration of evi-
dence of both movant and respondent and a prediction of how reasonable jurors
would rule. In addition, special classes of cases exist in which summary judg-
ment is to be even more reluctantly granted on the one hand, or more readily
granted on the other. The precedential value of any case is unpredictable be-
cause the decisions have not been consistently followed.
In spite of the ambiguities in Weeks, at a recent Hawaii Institute for Continuing Legal Educa-
tion (HICLE) meeting, Justice Padgett of the Hawaii Supreme Court and Judge Burns of the
ICA both stated, without hesitation, that the federal standard has not been adopted in Hawaii.
Justice Padgett also said that if there is the "slightest doubt" as to the existence of a genuine
issue of material fact, then summary judgment should not be granted. He stressed that summary
judgment should not be used as a method of calendar control and that, in his opinion, too many
summary judgments were being granted. Frank D. Padgett and James S. Burns, Remarks at
HICLE meeting, Motions and Appeals: The Art of Oral and Written Advocacy (February 3,
1990).
... See supra text accompanying notes 16-36.
187 See upra notes 37-79.
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There is, however, a salutary aspect to Hawaii summary judgment history.
The most consistent themes in Hawaii summary judgment cases are jury access
and public trials. This has led to a general reluctance to grant summary judg-
ment and has created a process of litigation fully accessible to all with at least
colorable positions. There is, in turn, a troublesome aspect to this ease of access.
Hawaii courts, in their opinions, have not addressed the concerns reflected in
the federal trilogy. These concerns are the added administrative burdens on
courts, the unnecessary costs to litigants and the distortion of settlement lever-
age created by the failure of Rule 56 to terminate cases without material facts
in controversy.
B. Embracing the Federal Standard
The second option is to embrace federal standards. To review this option we
have placed federal standards into two categories: first, the Celotex trilogy (di-
vided into "burdens of production" and the "substantive standard"); and sec-
ond, the proposed amendments to the text of Federal Rule 56.
1. The Celotex trilogy
a. Burdens of producing evidence on the motion
Recent references to Celotex and Anderson"' in Hawaii appellate court opin-
ions have fueled speculation that Hawaii may adopt the reformed federal sum-
mary judgment standards enunciated in the Celotex trilogy.'6 9 One laudable
feature of federal summary judgment reform is its introduction of a mechanical
framework to guide judges and litigants through the procedural maze of Rule
56. A similar framework of burdens of producing evidence, adopted by Hawaii
courts, might assist motion judges and attorneys in the orderly presentation and
assessment of summary judgment motions. It might deter the filing of some
motions. It would probably allow judges to grant a somewhat higher percentage
of defendant summary judgments. It might also enable litigants to consider
summary judgment dispositions as part of their overall litigation strategy. Of
course these projected "effects" might be perceived as benefits by some and
detriments by others. They are also speculative. Part of the difficulty of predic-
tion, and part of the difficulty of deciding whether to adopt Celotex, results
from the divergent views expressed within Celotex itself.
Where the movant bears the burden of persuasion at trial (usually a plain-
168 See rupra text accompanying notes 152-164.
169 FRCP Rule 56 decisions by federal courts, of course, do not control the interpretation of
HRCP 56 unless Hawaii courts adopt the approach of the federal courts.
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tiff's motion), the application of the Celotex framework is well understood and
the justices are in agreement. For example, if a plaintiff asserting a negligence
claim moves for summary judgment, it must produce specific evidence estab-
lishing duty, breach, proximate cause and damages. If plaintiff does this, the
defendant must respond by discrediting plaintiffs evidence, rehabilitating any
evidence in the discovery record that plaintiff has disparaged, or producing new
specific evidence contradicting plaintiff's evidence.
However, where the movant will not bear the burden of persuasion at trial
(usually a defendant's motion), the justices appear to disagree on significant
aspects of the framework. The question raised by their disagreement is whether
the defendant-movant really bears any burden at all. Justice Rehnquist's plural-
iry opinion suggests that the answer is no.'" 0 The movant needs only to point to
the discovery record and declare it bereft of evidence. In contrast, Justice
White's concurrence and Justice Brennan's dissent indicate that an equal num-
ber of justices believe that a moving defendant must bear a meaningful burden
of production before the responding plaintiff is compelled to fully assemble and
present its case."'
The uncertainty generated by these conflicting approaches presents a daunting
problem for plaintiffs. Celotex does not provide a plaintiff with a mechanism for
challenging a defendant-movant's failure to meet its initial burden, short of the
plaintiffs presenting its entire case. Even if a plaintiff believes that a defendant's
motion simply "pointing to the record" is ill-conceived under the Brennan for-
mulation, it knows the motion may be adequate under the Rehnquist formula-
tion. The plaintiff must present its affirmative evidence in response. The risk is
too high to do otherwise. If the plaintiff chooses not to present its affirmative
case, and is wrong about defendant's satisfaction of its minimal burden, plain-
tiff will lose the summary judgment motion. Thus, as long as the Rehnquist
approach in Celotex survives, a defendant can compel a plaintiff to disclose its
entire affirmative case simply by filing a bare summary judgment motion. This
creates the specter of summary judgment "harassment" identified by
Brennan. 17
This potential unfairness to plaintiffs would be exacerbated in Hawaii. In
Munoz v. Yuen,17 3 the Hawaii Supreme Court held that appellate courts are to
consider only the evidence presented to the lower court at the time the sum-
mary judgment motion was supported or opposed. Therefore, a plaintiff who
does not fully present its case in response to a defendant's summary judgment
170 See supra text accompanying notes 131-133.
... Justice Stevens dissented on other grounds, never reaching the question of what is the
moving party's initial burden of production. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 337-39
(1986) (Stevens, J. dissenting).
172 Id. at 332. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
13 66 Haw. 603, 670 P.2d 825 (1983). See supra text accompanying note 33.
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motion (which under Celotex need not be supported by any evidence) not only
risks losing the motion, it also risks losing the opportunity for meaningful re-
view of all of its evidence.
Accepting the Rehnquist approach in Hawaii would probably create insur-
mountable problems of unfairness. Defendant summary judgment motions
would likely be transformed into a strategic discovery tool unavailable to
plaintiffs.
Justice Brennan's approach, however, has considerably more potential. If
thoughtfully executed, this procedural framework"" could further the quest "to
secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination" of civil litigation."'
First, instead of allowing the defendant simply to "point to the record," the
movant-defendant is required affirmatively to show that an essential element of
plaintiff's case is unsupported by discovered evidence. The movant must iden-
tify the unsupported element and explain how the record fails to demonstrate
even prima facie support of that element. If, as in Celotex, "' the record contains
inadmissible evidence that might lead to admissible evidence on point, the de-
fendant must reasonably pursue that lead. If the plaintiff believes the motion is
premature, the court is encouraged to carefully and seriously consider allowing
additional time for discovery under Rule 56(f). Through this mechanism, a
court could prevent a defendant from forcing a plaintiff to prematurely bear the
cost and bother of assembling the entire case. The liberal use of Rule 56(f) as
an integral part of the summary judgment process could prevent misuse of the
relatively inexpensive and easy motion for summary judgment by defendants.
Additionally, where the plaintiff has had ample and unobstructed opportu-
nity to build its case, the framework reasonably expects plaintiff to be able to
make at least a prima facie showing of each element of its claim. The defendant
and court should be able to avoid a costly trial if the plaintiff cannot muster
minimally reasonable support shortly before trial. The plaintiff may in fact ben-
efit from the process of compilation and self-examination at this point. Settle-
ment possibilities may be enhanced. Properly executed, this framework provides
a measure of predictability, safeguards against the imbalanced distribution of
litigation power, and promotes efficiency for litigants and the court system. 7
14 See infra note 195 and accompanying text.
175 Fed. R. Civ. P. 1. Rule 1 indicates that the federal rules "'shall be construed to secure the
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action." Streamlining the summary judg-
ment process undoubtedly furthers the goals of speedy and inexpensive determination, but justice
must remain the first consideration.
171 See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
177 Cf Schwarzer, supra note 84. While arguing for greater use of summary judgment to
further efficiency and economy in the federal courts, Judge Schwarzer recognized that the reserva-
tions about summary judgment were not without foundation and that "supposed shortcuts (may]
be costly and time-consuming when not well managed." 99 F.R.D. at 467.
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b. Burden of persuasion on the motion: the substantive standard
Within the mechanical framework, a judge must also apply the substantive
summary judgment standard. Anderson'. 8 and Matsushita"9 indicate that the
applicable federal standard mirrors the directed verdict standard and incorpo-
rates the evidentiary standard of proof at trial - either "a preponderance of the
evidence" or "clear and convincing evidence."
The use of this aspect of the directed verdict standard at summary judgment
is appealing for two reasons. First, both judges and litigants are familiar with
these standards. Second, these standards would allow efficient disposition of
claims that would not get to the jury at trial. More summary judgment motions
are likely to be granted under this standard because responding plaintiffs would
have to show more than a scintilla of evidence to fend off summary judgment.
A responding plaintiff would need to present enough of its case to convince the
court that "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for
the nonmoving party.''180
The problem with the 1986 federal trilogy is that it goes beyond merely
incorporating the quantitative level of proof at trial into the substantive sum-
mary judgment standard. Anderson directs the lower courts to evaluate the "cali-
ber and quality" of evidence as well as the "quantum "... of proof. This is a
major drawback to the substantive standard proffered by these cases. The mo-
tions judge is invited to evaluate the quality of the paper evidence without
allowing the parties to develop fully the evidence and the credibility of wit-
nesses through the trial process. This may transform a summary judgment mo-
tion into a "full blown paper trial on the merits.''18
This troubling invasion of the jury's province is also seen in Matsushita
where the Supreme Court appears to "undermine the doctrine that all evidence
must be construed in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary
judgment."' 8 3 Judicial weighing of evidence facilitates speedier, cheaper resolu-
tion of claims, but at a price. Plaintiffs with novel economic or legal theories
may never get a public airing. Litigants may not be able to fully develop the
178 See supra text accompanying notes 105-122.
179 See supra text accompanying notes 85-104.
"' Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
.1 Id. at 254; see also 477 U.S. at 266 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
182 Id.
's3 475 U.S. 574, 600-01 (White, J. dissenting). The Matsushita majority stated that if "the
respondents' claim [is) implausible - if the claim is one that simply makes no economic sense
- respondents must come forward with more persuasive evidence to support their claim than
would otherwise be necessary." Id. at 587. The Court invited judges to evaluate the plaintiffs'
theory of recovery to determine the adequacy of the underlying facts to defeat summary judg-
ment, rather than view the facts in the most favorable light to the party opposing the summary
judgment.
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testimony of hostile or uncooperative witnesses. And, the impartiality of the
judge may be called into question. The price exacted by the judicial weighing of
evidence on the summary judgment motion is a price Hawaii courts historically
have been unwilling to pay.184
The Celotex trilogy thus offers some summary judgment changes that are
advantageous and others that are problematic. In a later section, discussing the
"Middle Ground" option, we have extracted the beneficial changes and incor-
porated them into a recommended framework.
2. Proposed Amendments to FRCP 56
The Advisory Committee to the Civil Rules has proposed a major restructur-
ing of Rule 56."' The proposed changes reflect the efficiency values expressed
in the 1986 trilogy. However, as currently drafted, the text and commentary
appear to go even farther, shifting the balance of power significantly toward
defendant-movants. Martin Louis, who has argued since 1974 that the defend-
ant-movant's burden should be lightened, calls the proposed modifications "un-
abashedly pro-defendant. '186 At a recent meeting, Professor Louis stated, "At a
time when in my opinion it is time to apply the brakes and steer for the middle
of the highway, [the advisory] committee still has its pedal to the metal and
very strongly."18 7
A detailed discussion of the proposed changes to Rule 56 is beyond the scope
of this article. In brief, the rule is substantially rewritten. One important change
provides for the summary establishment of fact or law, either on motion or at a
pretrial conference.' 8 8 Also, summary judgment may be entered upon motion
or, significantly, at pretrial conference on the basis of "facts stipulated or sum-
marily established or establishable as a matter of law."' 8' 9 Another change, im-
portant to this discussion, is the elimination of Rule 56(f) and the replacement
with the "new" Rule 56(d) which states that "summary judgment shall [not]
184 See supra text accompanying notes 41-47.
186 Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Fed-
eral Rules of Appellate Procedure and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 105-20 (September
1989).
"" M. Louis, Remarks at the 1990 Annual Conference of the Association of American Law
Schools at San Francisco, California: Civil Procedure Section Program (January 4-7, 1990) (Tape
71 produced by Recorded Resources Corp., 1468 Crofton Parkway, Crofton, MD 21114). Louis's
seminal article, Federal Summary Judgment Doctrine: A Critical Analysis, 83 YALE L.J. 745
(1974), is often credited with starting the movement toward federal summary judgment law
reform.
187 M. Louis, Remarks supra note 186.
188 Proposed Rule 56(a)(1), Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, supra note 185, at 105-06.
188 Proposed Rule 56(b)(1), Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, supra note 185, at 107-08.
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be rendered . . . nor shall any fact be summarily established, until any oppos-
ing parties have had a reasonable time to discover evidence bearing on any fact
sought to be established."19 The advisory committee notes state that the new
rule limits the discretion of the district court to withhold the opportunity for
discovery.191 Despite these assurances, there is no specified time period in the
new Rule 56(d) in which a party can exercise its "reasonable opportunity" to
use discovery.
192
The overhaul of Rule 56 inevitably would create a new era of uncertainty for
summary judgment law in the federal courts. It is unclear what impact the
amended rule would have on existing federal case law and what response the
new rule would elicit from federal judges. In light of the ever-changing face of
federal summary judgment doctrine, Hawaii courts should move with extreme
caution, if at all, toward the wholesale adoption of the current, or future, federal
summary judgment standards.
C. Towards a Middle Ground: Procedural Clarity and Substantive Integrity
The summary judgment mechanics of the Celotex trilogy articulated in Jus-
tice Brennan's opinion in Celotex would provide Hawaii with clear guidelines
for the marshalling of evidence and a well-balanced scheme that protects the
interests of both plaintiffs and defendants.19 The Hawaii Supreme Court began
the process in Mossman nearly 30 years ago and the ICA contributed signifi-
cantly in Arimizu in 1984;9 now, the Hawaii courts should seize the opportu-
nity to finish building a mechanical framework for Hawaii summary judgment
law. The framework we suggest, drawn primarily from Justice Brennan's "clari-
fication" of the plurality's general statements in Celotex,195 is summarized
below:
190 Proposed Rule 56(d), Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, supra note 185, at 112.
"' Advisory Committee Notes, Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, supra note 185, at 119-
20.
192 Although the proposed Rule 56(d) does not include any specific time frame, the advisory
committee notes indicate that a party would have a right to at least 30 days to oppose a proposed
determination. This is the time allotted under the proposed Rule 56(b)(2)(B). However, it is
interesting to note that a court may, for good cause, shorten or extend the 30 days under the
proposed Rule 56(b)(2)(B). Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, supra note 185 at 108, 120.
193 See rupra text accompanying notes 169-177.
' See supra text accompanying notes 16-36.
'" Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 329-32 (1986); ee supra text accompanying notes
135-145. We offer this summary based on Justice Brennan's framework for two reasons. First, it
is based on a far more sophisticated analysis of summary judgment mechanics than the general
statements of the plurality opinion. Second, it seems to balance better the interests of plaintiffs
and defendants than does the plurality opinion. This is discussed supra notes 169-177 and ac-
companying text.
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1. When the burden of persuasion at trial rests with the movant (generally, a
plaintiffs motion for summary judgment):
a. Movant has the initial burden of producing enough specific evidence to
make a prima facie showing on each element of its claim;
b. If, and only if, the movant's initial burden is met, the respondent must
(1) attack and discredit the evidence proffered by the movant, (2) reha-
bilitate the evidence in the discovery record attacked by the movant, or
(3) produce specific evidence not yet in the discovery record that contra-
dicts movant's evidence; or the respondent may request a continuance on
the motion under Rule 56(f) to conduct further discovery;
c. If both parties meet their burdens of production, then movant has the
ultimate burden of persuading the court that there is no genuine issue of
material fact and that it is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of
law.
2. When the burden of persuasion at trial rests with the respondent (generally, a
defendant's motion for summary judgment):
a. Movant has the initial burden of either (1) producing specific evidence
that negates an essential element of the respondent's claim, or (2) affirm-
atively demonstrating the absence of evidence in the record supporting
an essential element of the respondent's claim;
b. (1) If the movant's initial burden is met by producing specific evidence
negating an essential element of the respondent's claim, the respondent
can then satisfy its burden of production in the manner set forth in 1(b)
above;
(2) BUT if the movant's initial burden is met by affirmatively demon-
strating the absence of acceptable record evidence supporting an essential
element of the respondent's claim, the respondent may (a) rehabilitate
record evidence attacked by the movant, (b) produce specific evidence
not yet in the discovery record supporting respondent's claim, or (c)
refer to evidence already in the record or suggested by the record that
has been overlooked by the movant; or the respondent may request con-
tinuance on the motion under Rule 56(f) to conduct further discovery;
c. If both parties meet their burdens of production, then movant has the
ultimate burden of persuading the court that there is no genuine issue of
material fact and that it is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of
law.
The strong middle ground embodied in this framework has a number of
attributes. First, it spells out the moving party's (especially the defendant-mo-
vant's) initial burden of production options under HRCP 56(e). The defendant
can support its motion with specific evidence or it can show that the record is
bereft of evidence supporting plaintiffs claim. As to the second option, Justice
Rehnquist's vague direction allowing defendant simply to "point to the rec-
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ord"' 9  is avoided. Instead, the defendant-movant is instructed to "affirmatively
demonstrate" the absence of support for plaintiffs claim by summarizing and
analyzing the evidence (that may bear on the challenged elements of the claim)
contained in the discovery record. 9 " This may require the movant to pursue
reasonable leads to evidence that appear in the record.
Second, the framework recognizes the utility of Rule 56(f) continuances to
allow for further discovery if a defendant prematurely files a motion relying
upon the second option. It also recognizes Rule 56(f) as a possible mechanism
for challenging defendant's failure to carry its initial burden when it points
conclusorily to the record and asserts plaintiffs lack of evidence.""' By making a
Rule 56(f) request, the plaintiff is asking the court to halt the summary judg-
ment process because it is premature to require plaintiff to respond. Although
the provision is usually applied when plaintiff has had inadequate time for
discovery, it could be applied more expansively to enable the plaintiff to assert
the prematurity of his response in light of defendant's failure to discharge its
burden of production by inadequately "pointing" to the discovery record. These
dspects of the suggested framework ease the defendant's initial burden of pro-
ducing evidence, but also prevent the defendant from using the motion for
summary judgment as a tool for harassment or easy discovery. 99
Third, the framework explains the point at which the burden of production
shifts from movant to the respondent. It also sets forth in detail the varying
ways in which the respondent can satisfy its burden of production. These are
three significant attributes of a mechanical framework that endeavors to balance
the interests of plaintiffs and defendants and accommodate underlying value
tensions between efficiency and access.
Even if the suggested mechanical framework is embraced, however, we be-
lieve that Hawaii courts should part ways with the Celotex trilogy on the sub-
stantive standard for summary judgment. The substantive standard espoused by
the Supreme Court in Anderson and Matsushita encourages the motions judge
to evaluate the quality of evidence presented and weigh conflicting evidence as a
fact-finder without the benefit of trial." ° ° This is repugnant to the values Ha-
198 See supra text accompanying note 41.
197 See supra text accompanying notes 135-145 (Justice Brennan's explanation of the moving
party's initial burden of production).
198 See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
99 In part because Hawaii has yet to adopt a penalty comparable to FRCP 11, there is little
incentive to avoid use of summary judgment as inexpensive and efficient discovery. The adoption
of a Rule 11 identical to FRCP 11 is now being considered by the Hawaii Supreme Court. A
significant penalty for the frivolous filing of a motion for summary judgment would deter the use
of this motion as a harassment tool. Therefore, Hawaii courts could ease the defendant's initial
burden of production, making summary judgment more readily available in appropriate cases,
and avoid potential abuses.
Zoo See supra notes 85-122 and 178-184 and accompanying text.
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waii courts have consistently placed on access to the trial process.
We suggest, however, that Hawaii courts could incorporate the "level of
proof at trial" (e.g., preponderance of the evidence) into the summary judgment
consideration without offending Hawaii's high regard for fairness (through jury
access), provided that courts do so with appropriate safeguards. In many cases,
a plaintiff can at least raise the "slightest doubt" that defendant is entitled to
prevail. The current Hawaii summary judgment standard allows a plaintiff to
proceed to trial even without evidence remotely resembling a prima facie case.
Once a plaintiff has had an opportunity to make full discovery, defendants and
the court ought to be saved the expense and burden of a full trial if the plaintiff
still cannot muster a credible case. Incorporating the level of proof at trial into
the summary judgment standard would accomplish this. After adequate time
for full discovery, without evaluating the quality of the evidence, and viewing
the evidence in a light most favorable to the respondent, the cout would ask:
can a reasonable jury find for the respondent by a preponderance of the evi-
dence? If the answer is no, the court would grant the motion. Nevertheless,
safeguirds are necessary. In circumstances involving hostile witnesses who aie
uncooperative or defendants who are obstructionist throughout discovery, the
motions judge would need to consider plaintiff's difficulties in obtaining evi-
dence in determining whether plaintiff has presented a prima facie case.
Finally, as a matter of explicit policy, and in recognition of the added value
of public trials and jury access in certain circumstances, the Hawaii courts could
maintain the "slightest doubt" standard in cases involving issues of public im-
portance,2 0' issues of negligence,2 02 and issues of credibility or state of mind."0 '
These flexible standards would allow wider use of summary judgment to be
used more widely without compromising the underlying values that have con-
cemed Hawaii courts in the past. They would provide enhanced clarity and
predictability for litigants and motions judges. And, they would allow each pro-
cedural step of the summary judgment process to be evaluated in light of a
substantive standard that takes appropriate notice of the competing goals of our
adjudicatory system.
.01 See supra text accompanying notes 49-59.
10' See supra text accompanying notes 60-64.
203 See supra text accompanying notes 65-73.
